ABSTRACT: The paper presents the main characteristics of BETAMOD, a static microsimulation model that reproduces the Italian personal income tax (IRPEF), as well as local income taxes, namely the regional and municipal surtaxes, building on a detailed reconstruction of tax legislation. With respect to the vast majority of existing tax microsimulation models, the peculiarities of BETAMOD concern two aspects: the inclusion of a detailed set of tax expenditures, and the estimation of individual-specific tax evasion rates, which account for the total individual income level, its composition in terms of income sources, and the geographical area of residence.
INTRODUCTION
Tax-benefit microsimulation models have become a standard tool for the design and the evaluation of public policies in many countries (see, among others, Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2006; Mitton, Sutherland and Weeks, 2000; Sutherland and Figari, 2013) . Indeed, devising effective policy interventions requires appropriate ex-ante evaluation instruments, not only informative about the macro-level revenue consequences, but also about the distributional outcomes of specific interventions. In this respect, and particularly in a single-country framework, the accuracy of a particular model in accounting for aspects that are more salient in the national context, or the object of planned reform interventions, is key to its predictive power and, therefore, relevance.
In the Italian context, two aspects currently deserve particular attention. The first is tax evasion, which is extremely high, i.e. estimated in the range of 18-25% of GDP in terms of unreported incomes (Giovannini, 2011) . Various political leaders, as well as a significant share of the public opinion, seem to justify tax evaders on the grounds that tax rates are too high and the tax schedule far too progressive. At the same time, the distributional consequences of tax evasion are often neglected in the public discourse, or dismissed with generic statements based more on anecdotal evidence than grounded empirical analysis. For example, little is known about the distinct effects that tax evasion may bear to progressivity (vertical effect) versus horizontal equity and re-ranking (Aronson and Lambert, 1994; Urban and Lambert, 2008) . Microsimulation models have a major potential in this respect. The second aspect is that of tax expenditures. Over the last decade, tax expenditures in Italy have consistently increased as a share of GDP. Recently, the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance identified 720 measures of tax expenditures that account for about the 10.66 per cent of GDP (Keen et al., 2012) . Among these, the individual income tax expenditures are the largest (4.84% of GDP). Because of the entailed reduction in tax revenues, and the induced distortions in taxpayers' behavior, there is an increasing debate, both at the national and international level, on the use of tax expenditures as alternative to direct expenditures (e.g. see Avram, 2014; Burman, 2003; Burman et al., 2008; Poterba, 2011; Tyson, 2014) , also on the grounds of their regressive effect (e.g. Matsaganis and Flevotomou, 2007) . This paper presents a new microsimulation model, called BETAMOD, for the Italian personal income tax (IRPEF), including also local income taxes, namely the regional and municipal surtaxes, which tackles these two aspects. In more detail, BETAMOD improves on the existing Italian models where tax evasion rates are assumed to be constant within population subgroups (e.g. by income source type, by income classes), BETAMOD, assigns a tax evasion rate to each individual. This allows to evaluate more accurately how tax evasion may alter the redistributive effect of personal income taxation, and to measure the horizontal, vertical and re-ranking effects, each of which is possibly altered by tax evasion. Moreover, BETAMOD accounts thoroughly for a detailed set of tax allowances and tax credits. Compared to the majority of current microsimulation models for Italy, BETAMOD includes all kinds of individual income tax expenditures and allows us to estimate the distributional effects of all tax expenditures simultaneously and of specific tax reliefs or categories of expenditure in turn.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data set and the preliminary data adjustments and imputations required to simulate accurately the Italian personal income taxes.
Section 3 illustrates, in details, the process of constructing BETAMOD, focusing in particular on its 
THE MICRO DATABASE AND RELATED IMPUTATIONS
BETAMOD runs on the Italian national version of the Survey of Income and Living Conditions (IT-SILC), which represents, with a few exceptions, the micro-database currently chosen by most taxbenefit microsimulation models for Italy 3 . With respect to the alternative Survey on Households Income and Wealth (SHIW), IT-SILC takes the advantage of a more generous sample size (19, 399 households in IT-SILC versus 7,951 households in SHIW), allowing to conduct analyses by geographical area sample; the drawback of this choice is the lack of information on household's assets and tax-relevant expenditures.
We use the cross-sectional component of IT-SILC 2011, which features a considerably larger sample size than the rotating longitudinal component. The interview is structured into an household level questionnaire, collecting information on household composition, accommodation, housing costs, and economic circumstances (including savings, debts, receipt of family-related and means-tested benefits and children's incomes); and an individual level questionnaire, which is administered to all household members aged 16 years old or above. In the individual level questionnaire, besides ALBAREA, BERNASCONI, DI NOVI, MARENZI, RIZZI, ZANTOMIO Accounting for Tax Evasion Profiles and Tax Expenditures in Microsimulation Modelling. The BETAMOD Model for Personal Income Taxes in Italy information on education, health and occupation, detailed information on individual's income from various sources relevant for tax base assessment (employment, self-employment, old age and disability pensions, incapacity and disability benefits, rents from properties, investment income and other incomes) is covered. For income components subject to taxation 4 , the amount as net of taxes (and of social insurance contributions, where applicable) is collected, because net amounts are generally regarded as less exposed to measurement error and recall bias than gross ones. Reflecting the structure of the Italian fiscal system, where incomes earned in the solar year t are taxed in the following (t+1), the reference period in income-related questions is the previous fiscal year, that is 2010. This represents a mismatch with respect to demographic information, which reflects the situation of households at the time when the fieldwork was carried out (i.e. March and April 2011), and which has therefore been brought backward to 2010.
Still, an accurate simulation of Italian personal income tax requires additional information with respect to IT-SILC topics coverage. Most notably, the personal income tax base includes not only employment and self-employment income, replacement income, profits from non-corporate enterprises and a marginal part of investment income, but also figurative income on immovable properties, valued as cadastral rent 5 , which is not covered in the survey. Besides, information on specific items of expenditures (e.g. healthcare, house refurbishments, etc.) that are relevant for specific tax reliefs, are not available in IT-SILC. Missing information has therefore been imputed, drawing from other population-representative surveys covering the subject domains of interest.
We use the 2010 Survey on Households Income and Wealth released by the Bank of Italy (Bank of Italy, 2012), for imputing information on the self-reported asset value 6 of the main residence, and other immovable properties, used to compute cadastral values. Drawing from the same survey, we also impute insurance premiums and house refurbishments expenditures, relevant for the computation of specific, and quantitatively important, tax reliefs. Imputation from SHIW has been performed using statistical matching techniques, where SHIW individuals have acted as 'donors' of the otherwise missing information for IT-SILC observed 'recipients'. Matching aims at selecting, for each IT-SILC recipient, the SHIW donor that is closest to observational identity, i.e. the most similar in terms of characteristics, observed in both surveys that are predictive of the variable to be imputed. The quality of the matching procedure relies crucially on a so-called common support requirement of overlapping in the distribution of predictive characteristics in the donors' and recipients' samples, which has been empirically tested. The matching procedure we have adopted is based on a combination of stratification and Mahalanobis distance nearest neighbor algorithm (Rubin, 1980) . Matching has been performed at the household level and with replacement, that is ALBAREA, BERNASCONI, DI NOVI, MARENZI, RIZZI, ZANTOMIO Accounting for Tax Evasion Profiles and Tax Expenditures in Microsimulation Modelling. The BETAMOD Model for Personal Income Taxes in Italy allowing the same SHIW household to act as donor for multiple IT-SILC households, if deemed as the most adequate, rather than being discarded after having served once as donor. The donors' and recipients' samples have been stratified by main residence homeownership, other properties homeownership and geographical area, so that exact matching on these variables is ensured; then, within each stratum, the donor household has been selected based on the Mahalanobis distance metric, measured on other predictive variables. These include equivalent household income, the percentage of household members with more than upper secondary educational qualification, a set of household composition dummies, and the main earner's employment status. The quality of matching has been gauged by investigating the balance (e.g. in terms of equality in means) in predictive variables between recipients and matched donors, and the procedure adjusted as long as achieved balance was deemed unsatisfactory. More detail on the implementation of the matchingbased imputation, and the achieved balance, is reported in Appendix A.
As a result of the matching-based imputation from SHIW data, information on the asset value of owned properties is integrated into IT-SILC. However, for fiscal purposes, properties are valued in terms of cadastral rental values. Therefore, we build on existing Land Registry data, which provide information on the distribution of properties values and corresponding cadastral incomes (separately by gender, by age group, by household composition, by marital status, by geographical area and by main residence/secondary property) to derive a measure of cadastral income from the available information on properties asset values, integrated into IT-SILC. For assessing the cadastral value of the main residence, Land Registry information on the ratio between asset value and cadastral income is first of all expanded, using the RAS methodology 7 , to obtain marginal distributions across 300 subgroups, defined in terms of the above mentioned variables. After the IT-SILC sample has been correspondingly stratified, the cadastral value for IT-SILC households is computed as the ratio between the asset value of the main residence imputed from SHIW, divided by the corresponding asset-value-to-cadastral-income ratio 8 , drawn from the expanded Land Registry statistics. A similar procedure is followed for imputing the cadastral value of secondary properties, where appropriate The estimated parameters have then been used to predict the probability of incurring in health expenditures for individuals observed in the IT-SILC sample, based on their characteristics. As illustrated in the later section 3.1, the estimated probability of healthcare spending is then flexibly used, together with fiscal data on tax reliefs, to identify beneficiaries of healthcare tax reliefs, and to impute related expenditure amounts.
THE CONSTRUCTION OF BETAMOD
After the preliminary data adjustments and the imputations, the model has been built through 4 modules, integrated in an iterative procedure where outer loops (identifying recipients of tax expenditures, building calibration weights, computing individual-and income-specific tax evasion rates) feed into the inner loop of net-to-gross conversion, as depicted in Figure 1 .
In more detail, based on family and personal characteristics relevant for eligibility, Module 1 identifies round-specific beneficiaries and expenditure amounts for all of the non-simulated tax reliefs, calibrating them to obtain the totals and the income distribution for beneficiaries and Among tax credits, the largest single item is a universal tax credit granted for specific income sources: the tax credit is applicable for either employment income, or self-employment income, or pension income, with a withdrawal rate resulting in a decreasing credit as gross income increases.
This tax credit contribute to the income tax progressivity design, even more so given the absence of a legislated no tax area or legal zero rate tax bracket. Another set of tax credits aims at accounting for individual's ability to pay, given her/his household composition (i.e. presence of dependent household members) and her/his children characteristics, such as age and disability. These tax credits are decreasing in individual gross income and become zero above a certain income threshold. The children tax credit amount and income threshold depend also on the number of children, and increase for each child aged three years or below and for disabled children. An additional refundable tax relief is granted for taxpayers with at least four children. donations. Finally, a tax credits for up to a maximum of 55 per cent of the expenses incurred for energy conservation's interventions and house refurbishments, and a lump sum tax credit for rent paid by low-income tenants, are allowed.
As standard in other tax benefit models for the Italian system, and reflecting data availability constraints, BETAMOD fully simulates the deduction for main residence cadastral value, and the tax credits by income source and for dependent family members
17
. However, with respect to other Italian models, which typically 18 impute tax expenditures though calibration with aggregate fiscal data by income classes, BETAMOD calibrates not only expenditure amounts, but also beneficiaries.
In particular, we aim at achieving a more realistic identification of beneficiaries, for each specific type of tax expenditure item, based on household and personal characteristics relevant for eligibility. Table 2 and Table 3 report the individual and family characteristics we used to identify the potential beneficiaries of deductions and tax credits. Simulated and non-simulated tax reliefs include all of the current categories provided by tax rules, namely, 8 deductions and different types of tax credits, these last grouped into 17 main categories. Thus, the model offers a complete picture of the wide array of tax reliefs that are part of the Italian income tax. Note: (*)Due to lack of information in the data, beneficiaries are mainly identified among the taxpayers with the higher probability of receiving other tax advantage; this is motivated by anecdotal evidence that the probability of claiming specific tax reliefs increases in the number of other tax reliefs claimed. In order to increase variance some beneficiaries have been randomly chosen. Overall, in the light of the importance of tax expenditures in current and future tax reform discussion (Burman, 2003; Burman at al., 2008; MEF, 2011; Poterba, 2011; Tyson, 2014) , BETAMOD can be used to estimate more accurately the revenue and distributional effects of all tax expenditures simultaneously and of specific tax reliefs or categories of expenditure.
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Gross to net conversion module
To derive gross incomes, we follow a widely used procedure based on an iterative algorithm (see, Calibration weighting is a general technique for adjusting probability-sampling weights as of IT-SILC so that model estimates are consistent with external official data sources (among others, see Atkinson et al., 1988; D'Amuri and Fiorio, 2006) . As external data sources, we consider both population counts (from ISTAT official statistics) and official fiscal data (MEF).
While IT-SILC weights are built to match population totals (ISTAT), we adjust them to achieve consistency with fiscal data as well, so that the model estimates are reconciled with both the entire population and taxpayers counts. The variables used for performing the individual level grossingup are reported in Table 5 . In addition to the standard socio-demographic variables, we also consider the number of taxpayers with dependent family members because of the important discrepancies between the sample distribution of household composition and official tax returns data. We obtain the joint distribution across those variables using the marginal distributions in a RAS-like iterative proportional fitting. The household weights are then computed by averaging individual household members weights 21 . As apparent in the last colum of 
The tax evasion module
According to the previous empirical literature concerning tax evasion at micro-level in Italy (Bernasconi and Marenzi, 1997; Florio and D'Amuri, 2006) , we apply the "discrepancy method"
to estimate tax evasion rates. The method, based on the assumption that individuals report a more truthful income to an anonymous interview than to fiscal authorities, computes tax evasion by comparing the tax returns and income survey responses of similar individuals.
In the above mentioned studies the comparison is made in terms of after-tax income. This choice has two main drawbacks. Firstly, it overestimate the tax evasion rates since it computes them as the ratio of evaded income on net income, instead of on true gross income. Secondly, when taxpayers are compared by quantiles of net incomes, a problem of re-ranking may arise. In fact, with respect to the distribution of after-tax income recorded in the survey, tax evasion shifts downwards individuals in the distribution of net income in the official data, so that, especially at low-income classes, the tax evasion rates are over-estimated. To overcome these drawbacks, BETAMOD estimates tax evasion rates as the percentage differences between the true gross incomes (as resulting from the net-to-gross conversion module) and the reported incomes declared to fiscal authorities. Clearly, since the true gross income is unknown and it is the results of the net-to gross procedure, tax evasion may be affected by approximations that depends on the estimation method.
Tax evasion rates are estimated in three steps (see Appendix B). In the first step, aggregate tax evasion rates, stratified by area and main income source type, are computed comparing simulated true gross incomes with administrative tax data on reported income. As administrative data are provided in aggregates, by main income source type and, separately, by geographical area, we first apply a RAS technique to obtain the joint distribution of reported income by both dimensions. As a result, a 4×4 matrix of average evasion rates, by income type and geographical area, is obtained (see Table 12 ).
In the second step a distributional income profile of tax evasion is estimated for each area-byincome type stratum. We refine stratification expanding the 16 strata to account for the profile of tax evasion by income classes. In more detail, each area-by-income type stratum is expanded into 13 classes of true gross income, so that 16 income profiles of tax evasion are obtained. Finally, a tax evasion rate is assigned to each individual for each type of income source to overcome the standard procedure of assigning the same tax evasion rate to all individuals in each matrix cell.
BETAMOD selects randomly, within each cell, individuals to be identified as tax compliers, and those to be identified as tax evaders, then assigns individual tax evasion rates by using a beta distribution whose mean value is equal to the average tax evasion rate of the cell. Namely, individual tax evasion rates are calibrated so that the sum of individual evaded incomes is equal to the total income evaded in the class. This represents an advancement, with respect to other models, where tax evasion rates are assumed to be constant within population subgroups (e.g. by income source type, by income classes). This feature allows assessing the relevance of re-ranking between tax-payers due to the presence of tax evasion.
VALIDATION AND MAIN RESULTS
The ability of BETAMOD to reproduce each measure (gross income, taxable income, deductions, tax credits and net tax liability) relevant for personal income tax and local income taxes is validated First, it should be noted that tax evasion reduces the true gross income of about 61 billions of euro, corresponding to an average tax evasion rate of 7.2 per cent. The estimated tax evasion rate might seem relatively low in a country, like Italy, where tax evasion is a widespread phenomenon (among others, Marino and Zizza, 2012; Fiorio and D'Amuri, 2006) . However, the figure reflects the fact that employment income and pensions taken as a whole account for more than the 80% of total reported income (53% and 29%, respectively) and that the estimated average tax evasion rates for these two types of income are, respectively, 2.9 per cent and zero. As apparent in Table 6 , BETAMOD output and official fiscal data presents trivial (i.e. lower than 1%) differences in most figures achieving a very good performance in simulating revenues amounts and taxpayers' counts pensioners with gross income (excluding the cadastral return on main residence) lower than 7,5 thousands euros, or to taxpayers whose only income, if lower than 500 euros, is that from buildings. Focussing on deductions, Table 7 reports the number and the amount of beneficiaries for each type. Again, no significant differences are found between BETAMOD results and tax returns data, in particular, BETAMOD replicates well the largest deduction (the social insurance contributions).
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Some discrepancies can be observed only in simulating the number of deduction beneficiaries for donations to religious institutions (-8.7%) and for alimony payments to the spouse (-9.5%). In both cases the number of tax relief claimants is anyway negligible. is decreasing in income, the BETAMOD tax credit results greater than in tax returns data. As to the dependent family members tax credit, the striking similarity in the number of beneficiaries is motivated by this variable having been taken into account in the weighting design, while the simulated amount of tax credit is -4.0% lower than the official figure, presumably reflecting the sample distribution of household composition, relevant for identification of dependants. The other most sizeable tax credits, namely healthcare expenditures, house refurbishment, energy interventions and mortgage interest tax credits are remarkably close to the administrative figures.
As expected, the main discrepancies arise in the numbers of beneficiaries of the less sizeable tax Further insight into the distributional effect of different personal income tax components, can be gained decomposing the overall progressivity impact, as measured by the Kakwani index shown in Table 10 . This reflects both the tax design (i.e. provisions for tax exemptions, deductions, the tax rate schedule, tax credits) and the effect of tax evasion. We build on a reinterpretation of the Pfähler 
In other words, the progressivity of gross tax liabilities (π k Tg) is further decomposed in a direct progressivity effect resulting from the tax rate schedule π Table 11 , with Kakwani indices reported in the last column.
Tax evasion and exemptions (namely the cadastral value of the main residence) enhance progressivity, whereas deductions are wholly regressive. The effect of tax evasion is mainly due to its negative income gradient, reducing gross income more at the lower end of the distribution. The exemption of imputed rent increases progressivity since this figurative income component is proportionally more sizeable for lower income taxpayers. On the other hand, deductions have an inequality enhancing impact, plausibly motivated by the proportional effect of social insurance contributions on the self-employed being offset by pro-rich pattern of personal expenses. Not surprisingly, the tax schedule exhibits a major progressivity effect. It is tax credits though that are the most important determinant of progressivity, their contribution amounting to about 58% of overall progressivity. This is mostly driven by income-source and dependent family members tax credits, whose design entails positive withdrawal rates as taxable income increases. Other tax credits, subsidizing personal spending on a wide range of goods and services, including housing, healthcare and education, while less sizeable, do display a regressive effect. Clearly, the overall progressivity impact of each component depends on their relevance with respect to gross income. For instance, the value of the Kakwani index for the dependent family members tax credit is remarkably higher (0.5329) than the one for the income-source tax credits (0.3989), but the contribution to progressivity of the latter exceeds that of the former because of the relative weights. 
TAX EVASION AND ITS DISTRIBUTIONAL PROFILE
To showcase BETAMOD potential for analysis, in this section we provide some distributional evidence on tax evasion. According to our estimates, on aggregate €61 billions of gross income escape tax authorities, corresponding to a tax revenue loss amounting to about €16 billions 27 . Unsurprisingly, tax evasion arises mostly from self-employed income and, to a lesser extent, rental income from property: overall, 85% of evaded income is attributable to these two sources (65% and 20% respectively). The remaining 15% of evaded income is attributable to employment income, as pension income, representing a public transfer, can hardly be hidden from tax authorities.
Average tax evasion rates, by income source and geographical area, are reported in As arises from Figure 7 (a,b,c), the distribution of tax evasion rates varies across different income sources. Among individuals who hide employment income from tax authorities, low tax evasion rates are most often estimated. On the contrary, more than half of self-employed income tax evaders display a tax evasion rate that is higher than 60%. A similar distribution arises for rental income evasion; about 50% of rental income tax evaders display tax evasion rates between 60 and 80%. Figure The following Figure 8 , where tax evasion rates by income class are shown, provides further evidence on the negative gross income gradient of tax evasion rates, and allows to better gauge the income profile of tax evasion behaviour by income source as well. In relative terms, both for each income source, and for their aggregate, consistently with previous studies (Bernasconi and Marenzi, 1997; Fiorio and D'Amuri, 2006) , BETAMOD reflects tax evasion rates generally decreasing in Figure 8 Average tax evasion rates by type of income and by true gross income classes Figure 9 shows the total amount of unreported income. It can be noticed that, despite the decreasing profile of tax evasion rates, most of evaded income is due to taxpayers with gross income in the range 12,000-50,000 euro, and mainly to self-employed income.
Tax evasion, by reducing reported income, causes a relevant downward shift in the distribution of taxpayers by reported income, with respect to that by (true) gross income. To begin with, tax evasion may modify the relative position (in terms of reported income) between fully-compliant taxpayers and same-true-gross-income evaders, generating an horizontal inequity effect in income taxation. Indeed, while horizontal inequity is one of the major consequence of tax evasion, very little studies measuring it exist. BETAMOD evidence is provided in Figure 10 , where the two cumulative distributions of taxpayers, by (true) gross and reported income respectively, are shown.
The distribution of individuals by reported income is thicker in the left tail, when compared with the distribution of gross income, suggesting a downward movement, along the income distribution, of taxpayers who "benefit" from tax evasion. Table   10 only reports between class shifts, building on the availability of individual tax evasion rates, BETAMOD allows to detect further shifts happening within each income class.
Once taxation applies to reported income, shifts along the income distribution, give rise not only to horizontal inequities, but also to a re-ranking effect, with a reversal of taxpayers' relative positions before (i.e. reflecting the true gross income position) and after personal income taxation ( i.e. based on the reported income position ), which the model also allows studying. Although preliminary, the novel empirical evidence showcased here bears major implications for the accurate measurement of the actual redistributive effect of personal income taxation and its decomposition in the horizontal, vertical and re-ranking effect, each of which is possibly altered by tax evasion. In the past decade several microsimulation models were developed in Italy. For instance: the Siena microsimulation model (SM2) for net-gross conversion of EU-SILC income variables (Betti et al. 2011 ); the MAPP model for studying the effects of taxes and transfers (in cash and in kind) on the level of poverty and inequality (Baldini et al., 2011) ; the TABEITA model that reproduces the Italian personal income tax (Ceriani et al., 2013) , and the microsimulation model developed by Pellegrino et al. (2011) for the analysis of housing taxation.
2
Further material is provided in three Appendices. Appendix A describes the statistical matching between the IT-SILC dataset and the Bank of Italy's Survey on Households Income and Wealth (SHIW); Appendix B illustrates the methodology used for the estimation of individual tax evasion rates, and Appendix C shows the incidence of tax reliefs on reported income.
3
For instance, SM2 model (Betti et al., 2011) , MAPP model (Baldini et al., 2011) , and the EUROMOD module for Italy (Sutherland and Figari, 2011) use IT-SILC data; while, TABEITA model (Ceriani et al., 2013 ) and the microsimulation model developed by Pellegrino et al. (2011) Non-taxable incomes and benefits are taken from the survey, rather than simulated, in order to obtain the disposable income measure.
5
While cadastral income on the main residence is de facto exempted from personal income taxation trough a tax deduction, it is anyway relevant for other components of the tax benefit system, such as the means test for family benefits. For other properties, according to whether they are rented or left unoccupied, the actual rent received or cadastral income are respectively used in tax base assessment.
6
The SHIW question asks respondents to assess subjectively the value of each of their properties.
7
The RAS algorithm is an iterative proportional fitting procedure that estimates joint distribution of two or more variables given their marginal distributions. See Bacharach (1965) .
8
More precisely, the ratio has been multiplied by a 1.05 correction factor, to reflect a legislated uprating adjustment.
9
When secondary properties are rented, the actual rent received, as collected in IT-SILC, rather than cadastral income, enters in the tax base definition.
10
The MULTISCOPO Survey did not take place in 2010. Even though time distance between the interviews in IT-SILC 2010 and MULTISCOPO Survey 2013 seems quite large, this does not constitute an issue since we only used qualitative information that are actually comparable between the two datasets.
11
We have not included income among the control variables since the MULTISCOPO Survey does not provide any information about it. However, research findings have suggested that, while at aggregate level there exists a positive and significant relationship between healthcare expenditure and GDP (Newhouse, 1977) , at individual level, there is not a significant association between healthcare expenditure and income (especially when the health system provides universal coverage free of charge as the Italian healthcare system does). Indeed, full insurance coverage would remove the individual budget constraint and reduce or eliminate the influence of cost of care on patients' decisions of how much care to use. Typically, income elasticity of individual healthcare expenditure under full insurance coverage regime tends to be near zero (for details see Getzen, 2000). 12 We consider as self-employed members of the arts and or professions, sole proprietors, free lances, owners or members of a family business and persons receiving profits from noncorporate enterprises.
13
By 'reported incomes as estimated by the model' we mean the portion of true gross income that we estimate the individual will declare, given his tax evasion rate. In what follows, this will be referred to as 'estimated reported income', as opposed to 'reported income', which refers to official tax returns data. The gross income qualified for tax reliefs is net of cadastral income on the main residence.
16
Employees' social contributions are not listed among deductions as they are excluded from taxable employment income.
17
The simulation of tax credit for dependents required the construction of fiscal family that may not coincide with the definition of household adopted in IT-SILC. In fact, fiscal family members include the spouse, children and other relatives living with the referent person and having a personal gross income (before deductions) below € 2,840.
18
A notable exception is the Siena microsimulation model (SM2) which, building on an exact record linkage between survey and fiscal administration data (Consolini et al., 2006 , Consolini et al., 2009 , Donatiello et al., 2009 , is able to account for the full set of tax expenditures as observed from fiscal data.
19
The measurement of net labour earnings accounts for specific pay components, namely: net salary and additional compensations including the thirteenth/fourteenth monthly pay (a peculiarity of the Italian institutional setting), income from temporary project-based employment contracts, which are fiscally equivalent to employment income, and taxable unemployment benefits.
20
In computing individual tax liabilities, deductions are subtracted from reported income, to obtain taxable income. The gross tax is calculated applying the tax schedule to taxable income. Then net tax is obtained subtracting tax credits from gross tax.
21
An appropriate factor of correction is applied to ensure representativeness of households by geographical area.
22
The regional income tax is simulated by BETAMOD while the municipal income tax is imputed.
23
Simulating the correct number of beneficiaries in the quantitatively less important tax credits is, in fact, one of the most common challenges in microsimulation modelling due to the lack of information relevant for identification of potential claimants in the survey data, as well as to the small number of individuals involved.
24
The household equivalent income is obtained by applying the OECD-modified equivalence scales. We compute household's net income by adding all true gross income earned by the family members ad subtracting the personal tax liabilities.
25 Kakwani index measures the departure from proportionality as the difference between the concentration coefficient of tax and the Gini index of gross income.
26
The weight for the gross tax liability progressivity (π k Tg) is the ratio between gross tax rate (tg) and net tax rate (tn); the weight for tax credits progressivity (π k K) is the ratio between tax credits as a proportion of gross income (k) and net tax rate (tn).
27
The tax revenue loss refers to the personal income tax (15 billions), regional and municipal additional income taxes (800 and 160 millions respectively).
28
As previously explained in section 3.4, the decreasing aggregate profile results by the comparison between BETAMOD simulated gross income and reported income to tax authorities.
